MTProto is not end-to-end. MTProto is their obfuscated client-server transport encryption.
What the commenter above is referring to is Telegram defaulting to saving your messages on the server in plaintext. You can use a “secret chat” which enables end-to-end encryption, but that is separate from MTProto.
Your sentiment is correct though. Messages should not be visible in plaintext to the server.
yeah, that means not encrypted. When speaking to a web server, you are one end, and the server is the other. Tls ensures that there isn’t a man-in-the-middle.
In case of telegram, you are one end another user is the other end. Telegram themselves are, by design, a man-in-the-middle in this case. I’m not concerned about a different middleman intercepting communications between me and telegram. I’m concerned about any middleman (which includes telegram themselves) intercepting communications between me and my friend.
So no, telegram chats are not encrypted by default. Telegram can read them.
Thank you! It winds me up so much when people parrot that claim.
Telegram is encrypted in transit and encrypted at rest on their servers. At no point is any data stored or transmitted without encryption. Whether you believe their claims of never giving out encryption keys is another matter.
My view is that if the feds wanted my chat logs that badly they wouldn’t go after Telegram, they’d go after me and my device directly, and at that point all bets are off.
never giving out encryption keys is another matter.
but that part isn’t even relevant really… transport encryption isn’t per-user - nobody (meta, google, apple, banks) gives out transport encryption keys… and their “secret” chat bullshit is completely irrelevant because nobody actually uses it
I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make? The people that claim “Telegram is unencrypted” seem to be of the belief that literal plaintext is flying over the air for anyone with a mediocum of knowledge to easily intercept, and that’s just not true.
Lacking end-to-end encryption does not mean it lacks any encryption at all, and that point seems to escape most people.
To take it to its logical conclusion you can argue that Signal is also “unencrypted” because it needs to be eventually in order for you to read a message. Ridiculous? Absolutely, but so is the oft-made opine that Telegram is unencrypted.
The difference is that Telegram stores a copy of your chats that they themselves can decrypt for operational reasons. It’s up to the user to decide whether the additional functionality that comes with this is worth the risk of a hostile agent successfully requisitioning those chats directly from Telegram themselves, rather than just busting through your door and threatening to break your legs if you don’t unlock your phone.
On the other hand, if you fill your Telegram hosted chats with a whole load of benign crap that nobody could possibly care about and actually use the “secret chat bullshit” for your spicier chats then you have plausible deniability baked right in.
Lacking end-to-end encryption does not mean it lacks any encryption at all, and that point seems to escape most people.
Not using end-to-end encryption is the equivalent of using best practice developed nearly 30 years ago [1] and saying “this is good enough”. E2EE as a default has been taking off for about 10 years now [2], that Telegram is going into 2025 and still doesn’t have this basic feature tells me they’re not serious about security.
To take it to its logical conclusion you can argue that Signal is also “unencrypted” because it needs to be eventually in order for you to read a message. Ridiculous? Absolutely, but so is the oft-made opine that Telegram is unencrypted.
Ridiculous? Yes, you’re missing the entire point of end-to-end encryption, which you immediately discredit any security Telegram wants to claim:
The difference is that Telegram stores a copy of your chats that they themselves can decrypt for operational reasons.
Telegram (and anyone who may have access to their infrastructure, via hack or purchase) has complete access to view your messages. This is what E2EE prevents. With Telegram, someone could have access to all your private messages and you would never know. With E2EE someone would need to compromise your personal device(s). One gives you zero options to protect yourself against the invasion of your privacy, the other lets you take steps to protect yourself.
the other hand, if you fill your Telegram hosted chats with a whole load of benign crap that nobody could possibly care about and actually use the “secret chat bullshit” for your spicier chats then you have plausible deniability baked right in.
The problem here is that you should not be mixing secure contexts with insecure ones, basic OPSEC. Signal completely mitigates this by making everything private by default. The end user does not need to “switch context” to be secure.
Yeah that’s cool and all but you’re strawmanning. Your original comment, that I hear parroted a lot, is that Telegram is (basically) unencrypted, and regardless of your feelings about the suitability of MTProto (not SSL) that’s patently untrue.
There’s no evidence that MTProto has ever been cracked, nor any evidence of them selling or allowing anyone access to their servers and recent headline news backs this up. Whether you choose to trust them with your data is up to the individual to decide. I’m just tired of seeing the “Telegram is unencrypted” claim in every instant messaging thread, made by people who don’t know or care to know the difference between encryption and E2E encryption.
Google, on the other hand, routinely allow “agencies” access to their servers, often without a warrant, and WhatsApp - who you cite as a good example of E2E encryption - stores chat backups on GDrive unencrypted by default. They added the option to encrypt last year but nobody was forced (or possibly even asked?) to turn it on, and to this day no encryption of backups is still the default. And while you might encrypt your backups, can you be sure the same is true for the people on the other end of your chats?
nor any evidence of them selling or allowing anyone access to their servers and recent headline news backs this up
The entire point is that you shouldn’t have to put your trust that a third party (Telegram or whoever takes over in the future) will not sell/allow access to your already accessible data.
There’s no evidence that MTProto has ever been cracked, nor any evidence of them selling or allowing anyone access to their servers and recent headline news backs this up
Just because it’s not happening now does not mean it cannot happen in the future. If/when they do get compromised/sold, they will already have your data; it’s completely out of your control.
Google, on the other hand, routinely allow “agencies” access to their servers, often without a warrant
Exactly my point. Google are using the exact same “security” as Telegram. Your data is already compromised. Side note - supposedly RCS chats between Android is E2EE although I wouldn’t trust it as, like Telegram, you’re mixing high/low security context, which is bad OPSEC.
WhatsApp - who you cite as a good example of E2E encryption - stores chat backups on GDrive unencrypted by default
Security is about layers. E2EE is better than not having E2EE. Same as transport layer encryption is better than none. Would you prefer anyone on the wire can read your messages just because it’s not perfect in every single use case? No, and for that same reason, E2EE is better.
Backups can be made E2EE [1]. Is this perfect? No. But its significantly better than Telegram.
I’m only pointing out that Whatsapp is better for privacy than Telegram - I still don’t personally use or recommend it.
… can you be sure the same is true for the people on the other end of your chats?
Valid concern, but this threat exists on almost every single platform. Who’s to stop anyone from taking screenshots of all your messages and not storing them securely?
if a messenger is truly 0 trust end to end encryption, it doesn’t matter who owns the servers or the legal protections of data because they won’t have any data anyway. that’s why signal is so good, when they get subpoenaed the only information that they actually have is the last connection and message sent unix times or something. still secure regardless of being in the US and being run on centralized Amazon, google, and cloudflare servers.
Are there still apps that arnt encrypted?
Telegram, for all their security claims, is basically not actually encrypted at all.
This is incorrect. Telegram is not end to end encrypted by default. But it is encrypted to and from their servers.
TLS isn’t sufficient for messaging apps in 2024
Except Telegram doesn’t use TLS :) They use MTProto.
This is not me endorsing Telegram. I’m just pointing out your mistake. Telegram has other issues but it definitely does have transport encryption.
The above commenter said that their end-to-end MTProto protocol is not enabled by default.
Defaulting to just using transport encryption like TLS on a messaging app isn’t sufficient in 2024.
MTProto is not end-to-end. MTProto is their obfuscated client-server transport encryption.
What the commenter above is referring to is Telegram defaulting to saving your messages on the server in plaintext. You can use a “secret chat” which enables end-to-end encryption, but that is separate from MTProto.
Your sentiment is correct though. Messages should not be visible in plaintext to the server.
I dont know much about it, but Wikipedia says that MTProto is specifically for “secret chats”:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)#Architecture
Maybe Wikipedia is misleading here
You’re right, it is misleading. There are different “flavours” of MTProto. See here:
https://core.telegram.org/mtproto
(The major difference is simply whether the server and client share a key or two clients)
yeah, that means not encrypted. When speaking to a web server, you are one end, and the server is the other. Tls ensures that there isn’t a man-in-the-middle.
In case of telegram, you are one end another user is the other end. Telegram themselves are, by design, a man-in-the-middle in this case. I’m not concerned about a different middleman intercepting communications between me and telegram. I’m concerned about any middleman (which includes telegram themselves) intercepting communications between me and my friend.
So no, telegram chats are not encrypted by default. Telegram can read them.
Luckily I misuse Telegram only as a system notification program.
Thank you! It winds me up so much when people parrot that claim.
Telegram is encrypted in transit and encrypted at rest on their servers. At no point is any data stored or transmitted without encryption. Whether you believe their claims of never giving out encryption keys is another matter.
My view is that if the feds wanted my chat logs that badly they wouldn’t go after Telegram, they’d go after me and my device directly, and at that point all bets are off.
but that part isn’t even relevant really… transport encryption isn’t per-user - nobody (meta, google, apple, banks) gives out transport encryption keys… and their “secret” chat bullshit is completely irrelevant because nobody actually uses it
I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make? The people that claim “Telegram is unencrypted” seem to be of the belief that literal plaintext is flying over the air for anyone with a mediocum of knowledge to easily intercept, and that’s just not true.
Lacking end-to-end encryption does not mean it lacks any encryption at all, and that point seems to escape most people.
To take it to its logical conclusion you can argue that Signal is also “unencrypted” because it needs to be eventually in order for you to read a message. Ridiculous? Absolutely, but so is the oft-made opine that Telegram is unencrypted.
The difference is that Telegram stores a copy of your chats that they themselves can decrypt for operational reasons. It’s up to the user to decide whether the additional functionality that comes with this is worth the risk of a hostile agent successfully requisitioning those chats directly from Telegram themselves, rather than just busting through your door and threatening to break your legs if you don’t unlock your phone.
On the other hand, if you fill your Telegram hosted chats with a whole load of benign crap that nobody could possibly care about and actually use the “secret chat bullshit” for your spicier chats then you have plausible deniability baked right in.
Not using end-to-end encryption is the equivalent of using best practice developed nearly 30 years ago [1] and saying “this is good enough”. E2EE as a default has been taking off for about 10 years now [2], that Telegram is going into 2025 and still doesn’t have this basic feature tells me they’re not serious about security.
Ridiculous? Yes, you’re missing the entire point of end-to-end encryption, which you immediately discredit any security Telegram wants to claim:
Telegram (and anyone who may have access to their infrastructure, via hack or purchase) has complete access to view your messages. This is what E2EE prevents. With Telegram, someone could have access to all your private messages and you would never know. With E2EE someone would need to compromise your personal device(s). One gives you zero options to protect yourself against the invasion of your privacy, the other lets you take steps to protect yourself.
The problem here is that you should not be mixing secure contexts with insecure ones, basic OPSEC. Signal completely mitigates this by making everything private by default. The end user does not need to “switch context” to be secure.
[1] Developed by Netscape, SSL was released in 1995 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#SSL_1.0,_2.0,_and_3.0
[2] Whatsapp gets E2EE in 2014, Signal (then known as TextSecure, was already using E2EE) - https://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsapp-encrypted-messaging/
Yeah that’s cool and all but you’re strawmanning. Your original comment, that I hear parroted a lot, is that Telegram is (basically) unencrypted, and regardless of your feelings about the suitability of MTProto (not SSL) that’s patently untrue.
There’s no evidence that MTProto has ever been cracked, nor any evidence of them selling or allowing anyone access to their servers and recent headline news backs this up. Whether you choose to trust them with your data is up to the individual to decide. I’m just tired of seeing the “Telegram is unencrypted” claim in every instant messaging thread, made by people who don’t know or care to know the difference between encryption and E2E encryption.
Google, on the other hand, routinely allow “agencies” access to their servers, often without a warrant, and WhatsApp - who you cite as a good example of E2E encryption - stores chat backups on GDrive unencrypted by default. They added the option to encrypt last year but nobody was forced (or possibly even asked?) to turn it on, and to this day no encryption of backups is still the default. And while you might encrypt your backups, can you be sure the same is true for the people on the other end of your chats?
The entire point is that you shouldn’t have to put your trust that a third party (Telegram or whoever takes over in the future) will not sell/allow access to your already accessible data.
Just because it’s not happening now does not mean it cannot happen in the future. If/when they do get compromised/sold, they will already have your data; it’s completely out of your control.
Exactly my point. Google are using the exact same “security” as Telegram. Your data is already compromised. Side note - supposedly RCS chats between Android is E2EE although I wouldn’t trust it as, like Telegram, you’re mixing high/low security context, which is bad OPSEC.
Valid concern, but this threat exists on almost every single platform. Who’s to stop anyone from taking screenshots of all your messages and not storing them securely?
[1] https://www.tomsguide.com/news/whatsapp-encrypted-backups
also they removed it
it’s still there, but hidden. You need to tap the username in the chat window, and then it’ll be in that screen’s triple-dot button menu.
There are many where the server owners can see the messages, just not anyone else between the sender and receiver.
Threema and Signal are good options that don’t do this.
maybe not threema
Signal being an American company is also problematic.
These two are the best balance of security/convenience, however.
You can create and run your own Signal server if you don’t trust Signal.
Interesting. Are the server and client open source? Is a self-hosted server interoperable with the main ones?
Signal is completely open source and auditable by anyone: https://github.com/signalapp
if you were to create your own clone, it would not interoperate with the real one.
server location and legal jurisdiction shouldn’t matter for any truly secure messenger
What do you mean?
if a messenger is truly 0 trust end to end encryption, it doesn’t matter who owns the servers or the legal protections of data because they won’t have any data anyway. that’s why signal is so good, when they get subpoenaed the only information that they actually have is the last connection and message sent unix times or something. still secure regardless of being in the US and being run on centralized Amazon, google, and cloudflare servers.
Then the jurisdiction of software development matters. Don’t want a back door being forced into an update by the FBI.
The FBI can’t just force them to add malicious code. A bad actor could try to contribute bad code, but Signal’s devs would likely catch it.