A beak down of how Ukraine and the West lost yesterday with the ICJ ruling on Ukraine v. Russia.

Ukraine and the West defended the view under which Russia supported terrorist activities and committed racial discrimination in Crimea.

1. the Court reaffirmed that an organization cannot be considered to be ‘terrorist’ just because one State labels it this way. The Court insisted that for Russia to be liable for ‘funding of terrorist groups’ it needs at least to be present the «element of “knowledge”», i.e., that a “group has previously been characterized as being terrorist in nature by an organ of the United Nations”.

The accusation that Russia should be responsible for sponsoring acts of terrorism in Crimea fell completely, not only given to this, but also because “it is not enough for deliberate killings or serious bodily injury to civilians to have occurred”.

2. the Court considered that, contrary to Western and Ukrainian allegations, Russia cannot be found liable for facilitating any terror activity against Ukraine as the State did not have “reasonable grounds to suspect that the accounts, bank cards and other financial instruments listed therein were used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences under Article 2 of the ICSF”.

In the end, Ukraine’s allegations were considered to be based on documents with “vague and highly generalized descriptions of the acts”.

3. ICJ only considered that Russia violated its “obligation of a State party to the ICSFT to investigate allegations of the commission of terrorism financing offences by alleged offenders present in its territory” for one reason: “the Russian Federation provided no clarification as to the precise additional information that was required” and did not “specify to Ukraine what further information may have been required”.

This understanding of the Court ignored the fact that it also recognised that Russia started investigations and provided “results of investigations into two of the alleged offenders” and concluded that about the other persons, they either “d[id] not exist in the Russian Federation” or their location could not be identified".

So, this was the only reason why 13 judged considered that the Russian Federation has violated its obligation under Article 9, paragraph 1, of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

In the end, this was the ONLY ‘violation’ found by the Court and it is highly disputable.

4. The Court also affirmed that the evidence provided by Ukraine did “not establish that the Russian Federation failed to effectively investigate whether the acts complained of by Ukraine amount to racial discrimination”.

5. The Court was also “not convinced that the Russian Federation has engaged in law enforcement measures that discriminate against persons of Crimean Tatar origin based on their ethnic origin”.

6. The ICJ depreciated Ukraine’s “witnesses”, saying that “witness statements which are collected many years after the relevant events, especially when not supported by corroborating documentation, must be treated with caution”.

Thus, the Court found “that the reports relied on by Ukraine are of limited value in confirming that the relevant measures are of a racially discriminatory character”, reason why it concluded “that it had not been established that the measures taken by the Russian Federation against the members of the Mejlis were based on the ethnic origin of the persons concerned”.

7. The Court also concluded “that Ukraine has not provided convincing evidence that the ban of the Mejlis was based on the ethnic origin of its members, rather than its political positions and activities”, reason why Russia’s decisions were racially motivated.

8. Once again, the ICJ ignored that there was “discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians based on their ethnic origin”, as Ukraine only relied on “the difficulty faced by the persons concerned when choosing between the legal consequences of adopting Russian citizenship or retaining Ukrainian citizenship”.

In the end, the Court considered “that those legal consequences flow from the status of being either a Russian citizen or a foreigner”.

9. The Court also noted “that the Russian Federation has provided explanations [and] there is evidence that certain ethnic Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar organizations have in fact been successful in applying to hold events and that multiple events organized by ethnic Russians have been denied.”

Meaning that Russia had a fair treatment with everyone regardless of their origin.

10. One more time, the Court could “not find that the measures taken against Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media outlets were based on the ethnic origin of the persons affiliated with them.”

In the West, what we hear is always different.

11. The Court said that “even considering that many ethnic Ukrainian families left Crimea after 2014” it was “not convinced that this, together with the reorientation of the Crimean school system towards Russia, can alone account for a reduction of more than 90 per cent of genuine demand in Crimea for school instruction in the Ukrainian language”.

Still, the Court decided to conclude that Russia “has violated its obligations of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination”. Why?

Because, although the Court was “unable to conclude, on the basis of the evidence presented, that parents have been subjected to harassment or manipulative conduct aimed at deterring them from articulating their preference”…

… Russia “has not demonstrated that it complied with its duty to protect the rights of ethnic Ukrainians from a disparate adverse effect based on their ethnic origin by taking”.

Earlier, the ICJ assumed it was not enough to have witnesses’ declarations by themselves, but now they actually matter because Russia wasn’t able to prove the contrary?

The Court could not continue on this track of acquit Russia from all the accusations, reason why even after it recognized that Russia did not want to eliminate Ukrainian heritage, the ICJ has come to this conclusion.

12. The Court was “not convinced, based on the evidence before it, that the incidents with regard to school education in the Crimean Tatar language constitute a pattern of racial discrimination”.

In the end we can only conclude that the two violations “found” by the ICJ were, in fact, too fragile and highly disputable to be counted as real and serious violations committed by the Russian Federation.

Finally, the Court also noted “that the Russian Federation has produced evidence substantiating its attempts at preserving Ukrainian cultural heritage and has provided explanations for the measures undertaken with respect that heritage”.